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MODIFICATION OF THE RIPARIAN THEORY AND
DUE PROCESS IN MISSOURI
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until relatively recent years water rights legislation and litigation has primarily centered in the seventeen arid and semi-arid western states.' However, as
a result of increased demands on water resources for agricultural, industrial,
recreational and public uses, the more humid and traditionally water rich
states of the East have expressed concern for and interest in the conservation
and regulation of their water resources. 2 A significant number of these states
have departed from the common law riparian theory3 of water use law and
have enacted comprehensive regulatory measures, modeled after the water acts
common in the western states.4 In accordance with this trend there appears to
be an increasing interest in Missouri in state regulation and control of water
uses and rights.5 The purpose of this paper is to consider the constitutionality of
a comprehensive water use act in Missouri.
The case law in Missouri is not extensive in the area of water use law6 but
1.
I CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 153, 154 (1967).
2. Ten Eastern states have enacted comprehensive water use legislation;
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1301-15 (Supp. 1963); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6101-05 (Supp. 1966); Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 373.071-.251 (1965);
Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 19, §§ 52-78 (1961); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. §
27-1301-1408 (Supp. 1966); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 455A.1-39 (Supp. 1966); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, §§ 1-58 (Supp. 1967): Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§§ 105.71-79 (Supp. 1967); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 5966-01-115 (Supp.
1964); New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 58: 4A-1-28 (Supp. 1967); Wisconsin,
WIs. STAT. §§ 30.18, 144.03 (Supp. 1967). The constitutionality of any of these
acts has yet to be tested.
3. In all of the Eastern states which have adopted comprehensive water use
acts the riparian theory was previously recognized as controlling water use law.
E.g., De Vore Farons, Inc. v. Butler Hunting Club, Inc., 255 Ark. 818, 286 S.W.2d
491 (1956); Clark v. Lindsay Light and Chemical Co., 405 Ill. 139, 89 N.E.2d
900 (1950); Greenwood v. Evergreen Mines Co., 220 Minn. 296, 19 N.W.2d 726
(1945); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 180 Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (1942);
Am. Sand 8, Gravel Co. v. Rushing, 183 Miss. 496, 184 So. 60 (1938); Harp v.
Iowa Falls Elect. Co., 196 Iowa 317, 191 N.W. 520 (1923); Thiesen v. Gulf, R&A.
Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918); Paterson v. East Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J.
Eq. 40, 70 A. 472 (1908); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903);
Dilling v. Murrary, 6 Ind. 324 (1855).
4. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss specific provisions or
variations in the acts. They all provide for measures which substantially alter
rights recognized under the riparian theory and as a result they all give rise to
constitutional questions in those jurisdictions where previously riparian rights
were recognized.
5. Concern for Missouri water resources led to creation of the Water Resources Board by the Missouri legislature. The Board was directed to coordinate
plans for a program for the conservation, development and management of water
resources. See §§ 256.180-.260, RSMo 1963 Supp.
6. The statement is somewhat inaccurate. There are a significant number
of Missouri decisions concerning water use problems but a relatively few involve a determination of the extent or nature of riparian owners rights to utilize
water.
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where disputes have arisen with respect to surface or underground water rights
7
the courts have consistently applied the common law riparian theory. The precise
nature of the riparian doctrine will vary from one jurisdiction to another, but
in general the basic precepts of the doctrine are that the right to use or take
8
water is an incident of ownership of land adjacent to a watercourse or lake. The
landowner may use all the water necessary for his domestic requirements but
any use for artificial purposes must be reasonable in relation to the rights of the
other riparian owners.9 In addition, the doctrine prohibits the use of water on
non-riparian lands.10 The common law theory also comprehends that the landowners water rights are vested and cannot be lost or destroyed by nonuse."1 Not
surprisingly, in light of the valuable nature of water rights, several courts have
declared riparian rights to be "property" rights.12
The riparian doctrine is criticized on the grounds that it is an inefficient and
wasteful method of regulating water uses in that it prohibits the use of water on
non-riparian land. As a result of this limitation the requirements of non-riparian
landowners for water will go unfullfilled even though there may be an abundance
of water available. The doctrine is also criticized for its indefiniteness. Riparian
owners are entitled to make use of a reasonable amount of water but what is a
reasonable amount can be determined only after litigation and even then the
approved quantity is subject to change.
Comprehensive water use acts have been adopted to permit more efficient
regulation of water resources. The acts generally1 3 provide for state control of the
7. Armstrong v. Westroads Dev. Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Mo. App.
1964); Happy v. Kenton, 362 Mo. 1156, 247 S.W.2d 698 (1952); Dardenne
Realty Co. v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937);
Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W.2d 118 (1937); Greisinger v. Klinhardt,
321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928); McIntosh v. Rankin, 134 Mo. 340, 35 S.W.
995 (1896); Meyers v. City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266 (St. L. Ct. App. 1880),
af'd 82 Mo. 367 (1884); Welton & Edwards v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307 (1842).
8. Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, UNIV. or MicH. LAW SCHOOL,
WATER REsouRcEs AND THE LAw 133 (Pierce ed. 1958).
9. The English rule or "natural flow" theory of riparian rights has been
modified by the majority of jurisdictions in favor of the "reasonable use" variation.
See 1 CLARK, supra note 1, at 291. The position of Missouri is not at all dear,
the cases have not committed Missouri to either theory. Several writers have concluded that if the question arose today the courts would follow the majority and
recognize the reasonable use variation. See Mann, McLarney, Angle and Miller,
Water-Use Law in Missouri, UNiv. OF MissouRI COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE RESEARCH BULLETIN 889 at 30 (1965).
10. Armstrong v. Westroads Dev. Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Mo. App.
1964), 3 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 725, 125-26 (Supp. 1967).
11. Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, UNIV. OF MICH. LAw
SCHOOL, WATER RESOURcEs AND THE LAw 49 (Pierce ed. 1958).
12. State ex rel. Peterson v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 158 Kan. 603, 609,
149 P.2d 604, 608 (1944); Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 225, 233 N.W. 159.
168 (1930); Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 284 Pa. 225, 232, 130 A. 491, 494
(1925); St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch Co., 32 S.W. 260, 267, 143
N.W. 124, 127 (1913); Meyers v. City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266, 274-75 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1880); aIJd 82 Mo. 367 (1884); Shamleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Milk Co., 18 Kan. 24, 31 (1877).
13. Provisions of the comprehensive acts of South Dakota, Kansas, Oregon,
Minnesota and Iowa will be cited to illustrate the features of all the acts.
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allocation and distribution of water under a permit system administered by
a state agency.14 The right to utilize water is divorced from the ownership of
riparian land and the use of water is not restricted to riparian lands.15 All
waters of the state are dedicated to the state1' and although the acts protect
vested rights, these rights are defined and limited so as to protect only the rights
being exercised in a beneficial manner at the time the legislation was adopted.17
Given the nature of water rights recognized under the riparian theory the
provisions of the comprehensive acts give rise, in those states where previously
the riparian theory prevailed, to objections that property is taken without due
process of law in violation of state's and federal constitutions. 19 In an effort to
determine the validity of these constitutional objections with respect to a Missouri
comprehensive water use act the experience of other selected states which have
adopted comprehensive legislation will be examined.

II.

EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED STATES

A. Oregon
Prior to enactment of a water appropriation statute in 190920 the water use
law of Oregon was based in part on the common law riparian rights theory.21
The Oregon Supreme Court also recognized to a limited extent the doctrine of
prior appropriation. 22 Under this theory the right to use water is divorced from
the ownership of riparian land. Rights are acquired by the application of water to
beneficial use with the priority of rights as between competing claimants being
determined by the order in which appropriations occurred, the first appropriator

14. S.D. CODE § 61.0104 (Supp. 1960); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82.706 (Supp.
1964; OP,. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010, 537.135 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. §
105.41 (1) (Supp. 1967); IOwA CODE § 455A.4,A. 17 (Supp. 1966).
15. In general the acts make no distinction between use of water on riparian
land and non-riparian land.
16. S.D. CODE § 61.0101(2) (Supp. 1960); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a.702 (Supp.
1964); OR. Rxv. STAT. § 537.110 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. § 105.41 (Supp.
1967); IowA CODE § 455. A27 (Supp. 1966).
17. S.D. CODE § 61.0102 (7) (Supp. 1960); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a.703-04
(Supp. 1964); ORE. R.v. STAT. § 537.120 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. § 105.41 (1)
Supp. 1967); IOWA CODE § 455.A27 (Supp. 1966).
18. Mo. CONST. art. 1 § 10.26.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.
20. ORE. LAws 1909, ch. 216, currently Oa. REv. STAT. §§ 586.010-990
(Supp. 1963).
21. Ore. Iron Co. v. Trullenger, 3 Ore. 1 (1867); Taylor v. Welch, 6 Ore.
198 (1876); Hayden v. Long, 8 Ore. 244 (1880); Coffman v. Robbins, 8 Ore. 278
1880); Shiverly v. Hume, 10 Ore. 76 (1881); Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co.,
3 Ore. 496, 11 P. 503 (1886); Jones v. Conn., 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855, (1901);
Bauers v. Bull, 46 Ore. 60, 78 P. 757 (1904); Brown v. Gold Coin Min. Co., 48
Ore. 277, 86 P. 361 (1906).
22. Lewis v. McClure, 8 Ore. 273 (1880); Tolman v. Casey, 15 Ore. 83, 13
P. 669 (1887); Curtis v. La Grande Water Co., 20 Ore. 34, 23 P. 808 (1890);
Brown v. Baker, 39 Ore. 66, 65 P. 799, 66 P. 193 (1901); Butt v. Reed, 42 Ore.
76, 70 P. 1029 (1902).

i
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having the superior right.23 The doctrine developed out of the customs followed
on lands in the public domain. 24 Congressional acts25 sanctioned this method of
determining water rights and as the public domain passed to individuals the
Oregon courts recognized these rights.26 However, at the time of enactment of
the Water Code the doctrine of riparian rights remained a significant part of the
Oregon water law.27 Therefore, the Oregon experience in modifying the prevailing water use law presented constitutional questions similar to those which
would attend the adoption of a comprehensive water use act in Missouri.
The Oregon Water Code established a comprehensive prior appropriation system for regulating and administering the distribution and use of water.28 All
waters of the state were declared to be public and subject to control of the
state.29 An administrative agency was established to determine the rights of
applicants to use water as well as to regulate its distribution.3 0 The right to use
water was divorced from ownership of riparian land and although the Code
specifically provided that nothing should impair vested rights of any land owner
to use water, 1 vested rights were defined and limited to include only the right
to continue to use water in a beneficial manner to the exent that the water was
actually used beneficially prior to passage of the Code. 32 The act also provided
for loss of vestetd rights if the common law claimant failed to use his water rights
for a period of two years.33
In In re Willow Creek,34 the statutory change from a combined riparian
and appropriation theory to an exclusively appropriation permit system of water
use regulation was challenged by riparian owners as a taking of property without
due process of law. In upholding the Code as a proper exercise of police power
the court stated that the public interest and welfare required that Oregon water
resources be used in a manner which would insure the highest development of the
resources of the state.35 The court commented on the provisions protecting vested
37
rights3 6 and then went on to hold that the Code was a purely regulatory measure.
The court emphasized that water rights, like all other property rights, are subject

23.

McCormick, The Adequacy of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine Today,
LAW SCHOOL, WATER REsouRcEs AND THE LAv 33 (Pierce ed.

UNIV. OF Mics-.

1958).
24. 1 CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RiG-rs 153, 154 (1967).
25. 9 STAT. 353 (1849); 16 STAT. 218 (1870); 19 STAT. 377 (1877).
26. Cases cited note 22 supra.
27. Williams v. Altnow, 51 Ore. 275, 95 P. 200, 97 P. 539 (1908).
28. Title to the Water Code states it is an act providing "a system for the
regulation, control, distribution, use and right to use of water, and for the
determination of existing rights thereto ... " OR. LAws 1909, Title to ch. 216.
29. ORE. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (Supp. 1965).
30. OR. REv. STAT.
31. OR. REv. STAT.

§§ 536.010, 537.135 (Supp.
§ 537.120 (Supp. 1965).

1965).

32. 1bid.
33. OaR. REv. STAT. § 540.610 (Supp. 1965).
34. 74 Ore. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914), 146 P. 475 (1915).
35. Id. at 617, 144 P. at 512.

36. Id. at 616, 144 P. at 514. The court described the provisions protecting
vested rights as essential to the validity of the Act.
37. Ibid.
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to' reasonable regulations enacted in the interest of the general welfare of the
38
people.
If the court would have stopped there, the case would have strongly supported the proposition that comprehensive water use acts are merely regulatory
and therefore do not impair property rights. However, the significance of the
regulatory language was diminished by the courts development of an alternative
theory to uphold the act. Setting forth reasoning which would be expanded on
in a subsequent case3 9 the court observed that the legislature had the inherent
power to completely abrogate the common law rule of water use law and permit
the appropriation of water for any purposes and in any manner the legislature
40
considered wise.
In the later case of In re Water Rights of Hood River,41 the statutory
definition of vested rights was challenged as failing to protect rights which were
vested under the pre-existing law. The Hood River court acknowledged that the
Code infringed on rights previously recognized under the riparian theory.42
Nevertheless, the court sustained the validity of the legislation. Adopting the
theory first suggested in In re Willow Creek, the court concluded that the legislature had properly exercised its police power in abrogating the pre-existing water
use law and in conjunction with this change in redefining vested rights as well
as the circumstances under which they are created.43
The question of the constitutionality of the Oregon Water Code was before
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in California-Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 44 The court adopted a position similar to that
taken by the Oregon Supreme Court in In re Willow Creek.4 5 The federal court
held that the Code was a purely regulatory measure which was developed out of a
legitimate concern for the state's water allocation problems and was adopted in
the interest of the economic well being of the community by the legislature in
a proper exercise of its police power.46 The court observed that implementation
of regulatory measures such as the Water Code do not result in a loss or impairment of property without due process of law.4 7 The opinion acknowledges
that the complainant possessed substantial property rights as a consequence of
being a riparian proprietor, but the court concluded that notwithstanding that
these water rights are "property," they are like all other property interests,

38. This would appear to be the justification the legislature had in mind;
See 74 OaRE. LAws 1909, ch. 216.
39. In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924).
40. The court cited as authority for this proposition United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1898).
41. 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924).
42. Id. at 167, 227 P. at 1068.
43. Id. at 181, 227 P. at 1087. The term "police power" was not used.
44. 73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1934), af'd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
45. In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 181, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (1924).
46. The court stressed that the Code was very desirable from the standpoint
of assuring an adequate irrigational system.
47. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d
555, 568 (9th Cir. 1934), affd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

5

1969]

COMMENTS

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 5

"subject to the police power of the state and within reasonable limits may be
modified by the legislature in the interest of the general welfare." 48
The Oregon experience demonstrates the significance of the police power as
an instrument to sustain the validity of legislation which substantially changes
water use law. The Willow Creek court49 and the federal court in CaliforniaOregon River Co. v. Portland Cement Co. 50 recognized the Code to be a purely
regulatory measure, adopted in the public interest as a proper exercise of the
police power. The court in Hood River,5 1 apparently not satisfied with this
reasoning, departed from it by holding that although the Code may result in an
impairment of water rights previously recognized, these were modified by the legislature and accordingly the Code cannot impair rights which no longer exist. In
effect the Hood River court held that the legislature could redefine water rights
under its police power and this redefinition did not result in an impairment or
52
deprivation of property without due process of law.
B. Kansas
In 1945 Kansas adopted a water appropriation act based on the prior appropriation theory of water use law.5 3 The Act provided that all the waters in the
state were dedicated to the use of the people,54 and subject to the vested rights
of common law claimants, they could be appropriated for beneficial purposes
according to procedures established by the Act.55 Vested rights were defined as
the right to continue the use of water which had been applied to beneficial
uses prior to the effective date of the Water Act.5 6 In addition, the Act provided
that common law claimants who sustained loss because of appropriation under the
Act could recover compensation to the extent of their loss. 5 7
The Act represented a departure from the riparian theory previously dedared controlling Kansas water use law.58 The riparian doctrine prevailed in
48. Id. at 562.
49. In re Willow Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914), modified, 146, P. 475
(1915).
50. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d
555, 568 (9th Cir. 1934), aff'd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
51. In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924).
52. Id. at 181, 227 P. at 1087.
53. KAN. LAws 1945 ch. 390; currently KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a (Supp. 1964).
All subsequent citations to Kansas statutes will be to the current act.
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (Supp. 1964).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-703-04 (Supp. 1964).
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701d (Supp. 1964).
57. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-716 (Supp. 1964).
58. The natural or continuous flow theory of the riparian doctrine was
adopted in Shannleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24 (1877).
This approach was modified in Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 410 (1881) when the
court announced that a riparian landowner could lawfully use water for his own
domestic purposes including stock watering. In Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80
P. 571 (1905), the reasonable use theory was held applicable in Kansas with
respect to use of water for irrigation purposes and eventually the reasonable
use theory of riparian rights was recognized as the controlling doctrine for all
uses of water. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Shriver, 101 Kan. 257, 166
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Kansas 59 although the state was exposed to the prior appropriation theory by
statutes enacted in 188660 and 1891.61 The statutes appeared to authorize acquisition of water rights by appropriation but were construed narrowly to permit the
acquisition of rights only after condemnation proceedings.62 The court declared
that in absence of condemnation proceedings, the appropriation theory could
not be used to impair previously vested common law property rights. 63 Because of
the narrow construction given the early appropriatiorn statutes the riparian
doctrine remained a significant part of Kansas water law in 194564 and therefore
the adoption of a comprehensive water use law in Kansas presented constitutional
issues similar to those which would arise in Missouri if the theory of water
use law were to be modified by statute.
Against a background in which Kansas courts had repeatedly recognized the
priority of the riparian theory and had consistently rejected attempts to abrogate
the doctrine, constitutional objections to the Act were certain to arise. In State
ex rel. Emery v. Knapp5 the first challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation reached the Kansas Supreme Court.
The Knapp court relied on the reasoning announced in the Oregon case of
In re Hood RiverGO to uphold the legislation. 6 7 Adopting the language of the
Oregon case,0 8 the court declared that if the pre-existing approach to water use
law had to be modified or overruled in order to harmonize with the comprehensive legislation then this was a proper function of the legislature and one
69
within the scope of its police powers.
P. 519 (1917). For other cases applying the riparian theory in Kansas see Frizell
v. Bindley, 144 Kan. 84, 58 P.2d 95 (1936); Smith v. Miller, 147 Kan. 40, 75 P.2d
273 (1938).

59. One year prior to adoption of a comprehensive act in Kansas the common
law doctrines were reaffirmed as controlling Kansas water use law. See State ex rel.
Peterson v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 158 Kan. 603, 149 P.2d 604 (1944).
60. KAN. LAws 1886, ch. 115 § 1; repealed, KAN. LAws 1941, ch. 261.
61. KAN. LAws 1891, ch. 133.
62. In Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 239, 80 P. 571, 583 (1905), the court

states:
From these statutes it will be observed that the diversion and appropriation of water to beneficial uses has been recognized to be a public
use, and the right of eminent domain may be invoked for the purposes
sought to be accomplished. But manifestly proceedings under these
statutes cannot operate to the destruction of previously vested common
law rights. Property in the flow of water acquired under the old system
is protected by the Constitution of the United States and can be condemned only under the same restrictions as apply to the taking of other
private property for public uses.
For subsequent cases adopting a similar position see Feldhut v. Brumitt, 96 Kan.
127, 150 P. 549 (1915); Frizell v. Bindley, 144 Kan. 84, 58 P.2d 95 (1936).
63. State ex rel. Peterson v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 158 Kan. 603, 149 P.2d

604 (1944).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Ibid.
167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).
In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924).
State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440, 448 (1949).
In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924).
State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440, 448 (1949).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

7

1969]

Missouri LawCOMMENTS
Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 5

The constitutionality of the legislation was challenged before a federal
court in Baumann v. Smrha.70 The three judge district court upheld the Act,
reasoning that a state in the proper exercise of its police power could modify the
doctrine of riparian rights if it became unsuited to conditions prevailing in the
state and substitute a prior appropriation system, so long as existing riparian
rights are recognized and protected. 1 With regard to the requirement that vested
rights be protected the court approved the limited statutory definition of "vested
rights,"72 stating that is was within the province of the legislature and the courts
to decide what rights are "property".73 The court explained this holding by
declaring that there is no vested property right in the prior decisions of Kansas
courts and a change in decision or a change in legislative policy with respect to
what rights are "property" does not deprive a person of property without due
74
process of law.
In 1962 the constitutionality of the legislation was again before the Kansas
Supreme Court.7 5 The complainant contended that the provision dedicating all the
waters of the state to the public amounted to appropriation of property without
due process of law. In addition the plaintiff argued that the artificial or limited
definition of vested rights permitted the destruction of property rights previously recognized and was therefore objectionable.
In rejecting the assertion that dedication of the waters of the state to the
state was unconstitutional, the court declared that it is well established that a
legislature may in the proper exercise of its police power modify or reject the
riparian theory in favor of some other more suitable water use doctrine so long
76
as vested rights are protected.
A considerable part of the opinion was directed at the claimant's contention
that vested rights were not protected by the limited statutory definition. In
upholding the statutory definition, the court observed that earlier cases may
have established the riparian theory in Kansas and accordingly recognized water
rights to be property. Nevertheless, these holdings may be overruled and the rights
which were established under the common law disregarded in order to give effect to
the modifications of the riparian theory enacted by the legislature under the
77
police power.
78
The court quoted with approval from Baumann v. Smrha:
There is no vested right in the decisions of a court and a change of decisions does not deprive one of the equal protection of the laws or property
70. 145 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Kan. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
71. Id. at 624.
72. It is limited in the sense that unexercised rights are not recognized.
73. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D.C. Kan. 1956), afJ'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956)
74. Ibid.
75. Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963) rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
76. Id. at 334, 374 P.2d at 591.
77. Ibid.
78. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Kan. 1956), affd per curiam,
352 U.S. 863 (1956).
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without due process of law. Even though prior decisions of a state court
may have established a rule of property, a departure therefrom in a subsequent decision does not, without more, constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of law under the 14th amendment.79
The Kansas experience in regulating water rights demonstrates that water
use legislation substantially modifying pre-existing water rights can be upheld as
a legitimate exercise of the police power.
C. South Dakota
In 1955 South Dakota enacted a comprehensive water appropriation act 80
patterned on the Kansas and Oregon statutes. The Act declared South Dakota
water to be public property and subject to control and regulation of the state.8 1
A permit system to regulate the appropriation of water was established under
a state agency.82 The Act also provided that vested rights in water uses were to
be preserved. 83 Vested rights were defined and limited to include only those
rights which were being exercised at the time the statute was enacted or three years
84
prior thereto.
The Act represented a significant alteration of existing common law doctrines
of water use law.85 Previously numerous courts had declared water rights to be
property interest80 and in St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co.,87
the South Dakota Supreme Court emphatically rejected as unconstitutional a
statute which substantially modified common law water rights. The court specifi88
cally held the Act to result in property being taken without due process of law.
With such a background the constitutionality of the 1955 Act was certain to be
in doubt. However, the first case, Knight v. Grimes,89 considering the constitutionality of the Act did not arise until 1964.
The Knight opinion presented alternate theories to overcome objections that
the Act operates to deprive riparian owners of property without due process of

79. Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 337, 874 P.2d 578, 598 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7, rehearing denied, 875 U.S. 936 (1963).
80. S.D. CODE § 61.01-59 (Supp. 1960).
81. S.D. CODE § 61.010(2) (Supp. 1960).
82. S.D. CODE § 61.010(4) (Supp. 1960).
83. S.D. CODE § 61.0102(7) (Supp. 1960).
84. Ibid.
85. Stun v. Beck, 133 U.S. 541 (1890); Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D.
145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937); Terry v. Heppner, 59 S.D. 317, 239 N.W. 759 (1931);
St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32 S.D. 260, 143 N.W. 124
(1918); Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Jones, 27 S.D. 194, 130 N.W. 85 (1911);
Redwater Land & Canal Co. v. Reed, 26 S.D. 466, 128 N.W. 702 (1910); Lone Tree
Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 15 S.D. 519, 91 N.W. 852 (1902).
86. Stenger v. Tharp, 17 S.D. 18, 94 N.W. 402 (1903); St. Germain Irrigating
Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., supra note 85.
87. St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32 S.D. 260, 267, 148
N.W. 124, 126 (1913).
88. Ibid.
89. 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
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law. The court observed that common law water rights were not property in the
constitutional sense, and therefore, the water use law could be modified or
rejected entirely without its resulting in a taking of "property."0 In addition the
court declared that even if water rights are vested property interests they are
nevertheless subject to regulations which impair or completely abrogate existing
water rights where the public welfare so requires. 9 ' In effect the South Dakota
court held that the scope of the police power justified not only regulation of
property but also permits a taking of property without compensation in certain
instances.
The Knight court was somewhat more direct in sustaining the comprehensive
water use legislation than the courts in the other decisions discussed above. The
South Dakota court concluded that water rights were not entitled to protection
of the constitutional provisions and even if they were vested property rights, the
legislature's police power was not restricted to purely regulatory measures, but
was also broad enough to sustain legislation which impaired vested water rights.
II.

ALTERNATIVFS AvAILABLE TO A MISSOURI COURT TO SUSTAIN
COMPREHENSIVE WATER USE LEGISLATION

The cases discussed above all rely on the police power 92 to sustain comprehensive water use acts in the respective states. The police power is properly exercised only when the legislation is required by and is substantially related to the
public health, safety or welfare. 93 In considering the validity of this approach in
Missouri, a more humid and water rich state than any of the states discussed
previously, it must first be determined if the regulation of water rights is required
by the public health, safety or welfare.
The regulation of water uses in the arid states is readily identifiable with
the health, safety or welfare of the community and may quite appropriately be
summarily recognized as a proper exercise of the police power.94 Water use regulation in Missouri is less directly related to these factors but nevertheless, it appears
that this type of regulation is within the scope of the police power as it has been
developed in the State. The Missouri Supreme Court has described the scope of
the police power as flexible and changing with the physical and social conditions
of the state in order to accommodate all great public needs.9 5
90. Id. at 525, 127 N.W.2d at 712.
91. Ibid. The court cited and quoted from Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
92. The term is a summarization of the legislature's inherent power to perform adequately all the -necessary functions of government; see King, Regulation
of Water Rights Under the Police Power, UNIV. or MICH. LAW SCHOOL, WATER
RESOURCES AND THE LAw 271-72 (Pierce ed. 1958).
93. Id. at 282.
94. In the cases arising in the arid states this aspect of a proper exercise of
the police power has not been given much consideration by the courts. It has
been assumed that the regulation of water uses is a proper subject matter for the
exercise of the police power.
95. St. Louis v. Baskawitz, 273 Mo. 543, 571, 201 S.W. 870, 873 (1918);
Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 867, 191 S.W.2d 612, 617 (1945).
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Although the water resources of the State may currently be sufficient to meet
all demands, the increaesd requirements for agricultural, manufacturing, recreational and public purposes forewarn of potential disputes between competing
water users. To meet these increased demands for water the use of water must
be administered in a more efficient manner than is possible under the prevailing
theory.00 Regulation of water resources would appear to be substantially related
to the public interest and welfare.9 7
Notwithstanding that the public welfare may require legislative action to
modify water use law, such legislation must be consistent with constitutional
provisions which safeguard private property interests.98 The legislature's inherent
police power authorizes the reasonable regulation of property but it is generally
accepted that the scope of the power does not sanction or permit legislation
which results in a destruction of private property rights. 99 The cases cited and
discussed above suggest several alternative theories which could be adopted by
a Missouri court to sustain comprehensive water use legislation.
A. Water Rights: a Non PropertyInterest?

One of the more direct methods to sustain comprehensive water use legis00
lation in Missouri was advanced in the South Dakota case of Knight v. Grimes.1
There the court concluded that water rights do not rise to a sufficient property
interest to merit the protection of the constitutional mandate. This approach
would permit the modification and even actual impairment of water rights
without the alteration being susceptible to an allegation that the legislation
operates to deprive riparian owners of property without due process of law.
The comprehensive acts generally preserve rights being exercised as of the
effective date of the legislation.101 The primary question is therefore whether
the impairment of unexercised riparian rights constitutes a deprivation of vested
property rights.
It is arguable that the abrogation of unexercised riparian rights does deprive riparian owners of property. The traditional riparian theory comprehends
that water rights are an incident of the land and exist even though unexercised.
Despite this common law view of riparian rights, a Missouri court could very
well conclude that unexercised rights are not vested in the constitutional sense.
Missouri case law is not extensive in the area of water rights, and further a
definitive statement by a Missouri court as to the precise nature of a riparian
96. The riparian theory is criticized because it restricts the use of water to
riparian land and because it is too indefinite, both attributes resulting in the
inefficient use of water.
97. The United States Supreme Court recognized in a case arising in New
Jersey, that even in humid or water rich areas the legislature has within the
scope of its police power the authority to regulate water resources; see Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
98. Mo. CONST. art. 1 §§ 10, 26.
99. King, supra note 92, at 283.
100. 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
101. The Iowa Act is somewhat unique in that it purports to preserve vested
rights but does not define what rights are to be considered vested.
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right in Missouri does not exist. 102 The absence of a prior decision specifically
recognizing the unexercised right as a vested property right permits a court to
define the nature of riparian right without being constrained by prior holdings.
The Missouri courts could follow the traditional riparian theory and recognize the unexercised right as a vested property right, but the conclusions Missouri courts have reached in regard to police power legislation in other fields is
some indication that the court would conclude that unexercised rights are not
vested and can therefore be restricted without an unconstitutional deprivation of
property. The courts have repeatedly upheld zoning legislation which significantly
restricts the future use of land.103 The courts have concluded that future uses
are too indefinite and uncertain to be considered vested property rights and
they can therefore be significantly restricted without an unconstitutional deprivation of property.104 Unexercised water rights are equally uncertain and indefinite and a similar conclusion with respect to the unexercised rights would
only be consistent.
Once it is recognized that unexercised rights can be cut off without impairing vested rights, the comprehensive water use legislation can be upheld as a purely
05
regulatory measure.'
B. Retroactive Application of a Modification of Property .Law
An alternative theory, if Missouri is unwilling to conclude that unexercised
rights are not vested property interests, was raised by several Kansas'06 and
Oregon courts.oT The opinions suggest that no one has a vested right in the
decisions of a court and therefore prior decisions may be overruled and the
rights established under those prior cases completely abrogated by the legislature
in a proper exercise of its police power. In effect, comprehensive water use legislation which concededly would impair rights recognized under the riparian theory
can be sustained because the rights no longer exist after the decisions which
recognized them are overruled or supplanted by legislation.08

102. Dictum in one Missouri case has described the riparian right as a
vested property right. See Meyers v. City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266, 274 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1880).
103. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W.
720 (En Banc 1927), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 662 (1928); Women's Christian
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 190 S.W.2d 900 (1945); Flora Realty
& Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 344
U.S. 802 (1952); Downing v. City of Joplin, 312 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1958).
104. Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1965); cases cited
Note 103 supra.
105. Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 525, 127 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1964).
106. State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440, 448 (1949);
Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 334, 374 P.2d 578, 591 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
107. In re Willow Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 616-17, 144 P. 505, 512, 514 (1914);
In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 181, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (1924).
108. This theory would permit abrogation of all water rights, exercised as
well as unexercised.
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It cannot be disputed that the people do not have a vested right in the
decisions of a court and accordingly prior decisions may be overruled or modified.
However, alteration of property rights is traditionally restricted to a prospective
application. Adoption of this theory in Missouri could lead to confusion and
uncertainty with respect to all manner of property rights.
If the modification of water rights can be given retroactive effect so as to
abrogate previously vested rights, then all manner of private property may be
taken without compensation. It is unlikely that such a proposition will be accepted
by the Missouri courts.
C. Expanded Police Power Theory
The final theory developed in the cases reviewed involves a significant expansion and modification of traditional concepts as to the scope of a legislature's
police powers. The South Dakota Supreme Court suggested that the police power
authorized not only regulation but where the public interest required, an actual
taking of property was permissible.109
Acceptance of the proposition that the scope of the police power authorizes
the enactment of measures which not only regulate but in addition, destroy vested
property rights is unlikely in Missouri."10 Recognition of this theory renders
the constitutional prohibitions meaningless and the eminent domain powers unnecessary.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The unequaled importance of water as a vital resource to all facets of life
and the increasing demands being made upon this resource, require that the
legislature enact comprehensive measures to insure that our water resources are
used in the most efficient manner possible.
The contention that unexercised water rights are not vested property interests is the most persuasive of the approaches suggested to sustain comprehensive
water use legislation. Adoption of this approach in Missouri would be a proper
method to sustain highly desirable water use legislation.
JAm-Fs D.

ELLIS

109. Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
110. Missouri has been unwilling to expand the scope of the police power in
zoning cases to permit destruction of vested rights. For a case making an inroad on
this traditional approach to the police power see University City v. Diveley Auto
Body Co., 417 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
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